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Abstract. This paper presents a case study in “black-box” assessment of a 
“smart” device where, based only on the user manuals and the instrument itself, 
we try to build confidence in smart device reliability. To perform the black-box 
assessment, we developed a test environment which automates the generation 
of test data, their execution and interpretation of the results. The assessment 
was made more complex by the inherent non-determinism of the device. For 
example, non-determinism can arise due to inaccuracy in an analogue 
measurement made by the device when two alternative actions are possible 
depending on the measured value. This non-determinism makes it difficult to 
predict the output values that are expected from a test sequence of analogue 
input values. The paper presents two approaches to dealing with this difficulty: 
(1) based on avoidance of test values that could have multiple responses, (2) 
based on consideration of all possible interpretations of input data. To support 
the second approach we use advanced modelling and simulation techniques to 
predict all the likely interpretations and check whether any of them is observed 
at the smart device output. 
Keywords: testing, non-determinism, smart instruments, safety. 
1   Introduction 
The justification of smart instruments has become an important topic in the nuclear 
industry [1]. These instruments have operational and safety benefits as they are more 
accurate and require less calibration, but since they are programmable devices, there 
is a potential for software defects within the device, which could result in 
unpredictable behaviour.  
Ideally some independent assessment of the development information and 
firmware should be performed to gain assurance that the behaviour is predictable. In 
practice, however, it may not be possible and independent “black-box” testing [2] 
may be necessary to gain confidence in the device. “Black-box” testing is based 
solely on publicly available artefacts—typically the user manuals (for operation and 
maintenance) and the instrument itself. 
In this paper we describe the test environment we have developed to automate the 
process of test data generation, test execution and result checking. This was used to 
perform a range of automated black-box tests on a commercially available smart 
device. We found that a key difficulty in automating these tests was the 
non-deterministic response of the smart device to certain input values. We describe 
the strategies we have used to overcome this problem. 
2   Non-determinism in Smart Devices 
Smart instruments are physical devices to which we feed the input and read the 
corresponding output. For the purpose of this section we are assuming that a smart 
device: 
• has an analogue input to measure some plant parameter 
• has a configurable alarm, which is set on when the input value exceeds a certain 
limit 
• has a configurable deadband, to avoid “jitter” the alarm is only turned off when the 
input value drops below the deadband 
No matter what test environment we use to analyse such an instrument, 
non-determinism is unavoidable. It arises from a number of different sources that are 
inherent to smart devices. In particular: 
• smart device accuracy 
• smart device sample rates 
• smart device response lags 
In addition, the test harness can be a further source of uncertainty when checking the 
correctness of the results. 
2.1   Smart Device Accuracy 
Inaccuracy in the measured input value leads to a non-deterministic output result 
when the input value is close to some configured alarm limit as shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. Non-determinism due to smart device inaccuracy 
The smart device measurement inaccuracy is represented by the thick grey line. If the 
internally measured value could lie on either side of the alarm limit (due to smart 
device measurement inaccuracy) then two alternative alarm states are possible. The 
test results only become deterministic when the measured value ensures that only a 
single alarm state is possible (e.g. when the measured value drops well below the 
deadband). 
2.2   Discrete Sampling Intervals 
A similar non-determinism problem arises if smart device measurements are only 
performed at discrete time points (see Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2. Non-determinism due to discrete smart device sample intervals 
 
It can be seen that the device will not “see” a short excursion above the alarm limit if 
the measurement samples straddle the excursion (solid lines) but the device would see 
the excursion if a sample coincided with the excursion (dashed lines). As we have no 
way of knowing when the samples occur within the smart device, we cannot 
determine which alarm state is expected even if the test equipment and smart device 
were absolutely accurate. 
2.3   Smart Device Lags 
Even if the alarm activation decision is deterministic, there is still uncertainty about 
when the expected response will appear at the smart device output. This is illustrated 
in Fig. 3 below. 
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Fig. 3. Non-determinism due to uncertain response times 
This arises from: 
• uncertainty about when the smart device samples the input 
• lags introduced by internal filtering algorithms 
• uncertainty about the computation time taken to decide the alarm state 
• variation in the time needed to physically switch an alarm relay to another state 
2.4   Non-determinism in the Test Harness 
The test harness is also a source of non-determinism due to: 
• Finite accuracy. This increases the uncertainty in the measured value as seen by the 
smart device. 
• Lags in the test relays. Special test relays controlled by the PC can simulate events 
like broken wires or power interruption. It can take a finite time to activate and 
deactivate a test relay, and this can extend the apparent time taken by the device in 
responding to the event. 
3   Testing Non-deterministic Systems 
To test smart instruments we have to address all the types of non-determinism 
described above. We can do it in the following way: 
• smart device accuracy – by taking one of the approaches: (1) avoidance of inputs 
which are “close” to an alarm limit (i.e. beyond the inaccuracies introduced by the 
smart device and the test harness) or (2) detailed analysis of all the possible 
interpretations of the inputs by the device to assess which outputs may be correct 
• smart device sample rates – by holding the test value steady for a fixed “settling 
time” before reading the result 
• smart device response lags – by holding the test value steady for a fixed “settling 
time” before reading the result 
• test harness – by allowing for the operation of test relays in the “settling time” 
(lags in the test relays) and taking the steps mentioned in bullet 1 (finite accuracy) 
Avoidance of inputs which are “close” to an alarm limit should, in theory, ensure that 
the smart device will respond in a deterministic way where each input measurement is 
interpreted as being definitely above or below the decision point. So we should be 
able to predict the alarm output values for each. 
However this restricts the scope for realistic testing and may make the detection of 
some bugs impossible, e.g. a device may enter erroneous state after receiving a value 
which is interpreted as equal to the decision point. If we wish to simulate typical plant 
operation we should allow any realistic sequence of input values, including 
• continuously changing values 
• inputs close to the alarm limit 
If this is allowed, then analysis of the smart device outputs becomes much more 
difficult. The test result checker has to: 
• identify when input values can result in different responses (given the uncertainties 
in accuracy and timing in the smart device) 
• maintain different execution threads for the different input interpretations  
• accept a set of output results that agree with any current thread 
This mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 4. If the actual result does not correspond 
with a given thread, the thread is discarded. If all the threads are removed this way, 
the result checker indicates a potential error. 
The figure shows a simplified version of the problem. Smart sensors often set an 
alarm after a configurable delay (i.e. the input must stay above the limit for at least 
certain time). If we remain “close” to a decision point for some time, assuming that a 
delay is set, the number of threads may be thousands or millions rather than the two 
shown in Fig. 4. The complexity of the analysis depends on the frequency with which 
the device can change interpretation of a constant input being “close” to a decision 
point. We can influence the complexity of the analysis by changing this assumption 
and as a result obtaining more or less false positives (Section 6 gives an example). 
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Fig. 4. Handling non-deterministic test results 
4   Black-box Testing Case Study 
The smart device chosen for this study is a smart sensor alarm unit that can measure a 
plant parameter and raise an alarm if a programmable limit is violated. The smart 
sensor used in this study can monitor a wide range of plant measurements (via 
thermocouple, resistance, or 4-20mA input signals). The device controls four relay 
outputs to annunciate different alarm states. 
The smart device can be configured to: 
• use different plant input sensors 
• trigger an alarm on high or low measured values 
• avoid alarm “jitter” by specifying latching, alarm delays and deadbands 
• detect rapid rates of change 
• raise an alarm if internal errors are detected 
The device also has LED status indicators which reflect the current state of each 
alarm relay. There is a push-button input that can be used to manually reset alarms 
that are configured to latch to the “on” state. The device can be configured via front 
panel pushbuttons and a display screen. It can also be programmed via configuration 
software running on a PC connected to the device by a serial interface. 
5   Test Harness 
We implemented a test harness to support functional test definition, execution and 
analysis of the results. The harness is composed of three parts (as shown in Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5. Test harness elements 
The harness comprises: 
• An off-line test data generator. This produces test cases according to some strategy. 
The results are stored in a test data file. 
• An on-line test execution system, which reads the test data file, applies the test to 
the smart device and records the result. 
• An off-line result checker, which takes the test data file, computes the expected 
results and compares this against the result generated by the smart device. 
We chose to use off-line test generation and checking because this gives us additional 
flexibility. If there are errors in the checker, the test result file is still valid, so we only 
need to fix the checker. 
5.1   Test Data Generator 
We developed an application for test data generation. The application generates tests 
using two different strategies: 
• Statistical tests. This is an approximation of plant transients where the input 
increases to some limit with random fluctuations. An example of a transient is 
depicted in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Simulated transient test sequence 
• Random tests. These are designed to maximise changes in the alarm outputs. An 
example is depicted in Fig. 7. 
 Fig. 7. Random test sequence 
5.2   On-line Test Execution System 
The on-line test execution system comprised: 
• a PC with analogue and digital interfaces connected to the smart device 
• a LabVIEW program to read the data file with test cases to the smart device and 
record the results 
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Fig. 8. Test harness schematic 
The test environment (shown in Fig. 8) includes control of test relays to simulate 
broken wire conditions, and the operation of a manual reset button. We were also 
reading the output of the smart sensor to compare it with the test input and understand 
if differences observed can influence interpretation of the results. We tried to read 
back the test signal generated by the analogue interface by feeding it back to an 
analogue input so that it could be read by the PC. This however, affected the accuracy 
of the other analogue interfaces. Therefore, after doing some experiments we decided 
to remove this connection. 
The test execution system is composed of: 
• a personal computer, which runs a LabVIEW application controlling test execution 
and another application for configuring the smart sensor 
• a card with relays extending the PC interface (InLog PCX-4288) 
• a data acquisition device extending the PC interface (National Instruments 
USB-6008/6009) 
• a smart sensor undergoing tests 
• an analogue lab board providing voltage source for testing the state of the smart 
sensor 
In this configuration, the test signal error was about ±10mV (around 0.2% of the full 
scale value). 
The hardware was controlled by two Microsoft Windows application written in 
LabVIEW [3]. We developed: 
• a manually operated test-bench application 
• an automated test execution application 
The test-bench application was used to check out the hardware of our test 
execution system. It has a knob to adjust the input, diagrams, indicator lamps 
presenting the state of the alarms, and switches to simulate “broken wire” and 
pressing the reset button of the smart sensor. It also has four charts which display a 
diagram with the output from the alarms. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Test-bench application (GUI) 
The test execution application performs a set of pre-defined tests stored in a file 
created by the application for test data generation. The application has the following 
functionality: 
• It reads input from a data file (i.e. the voltage for the analogue input of the smart 
sensor, the state of the reset button and the state of the “broken wire” relay). 
• It provides input in a loop to the device acquisition card and sets the state of relays. 
• It reads output (i.e. the state of the analogue output and the state of the alarms) in a 
loop and writes it together with the corresponding input to a file. 
The model of the application is given in Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 10. Test execution application model 
Execution of one test takes 2s or 6s depending on whether a reset is part of the test. 
We found that we needed 2s for simulating the input because with shorter delays 
(e.g. 1s) behaviour of the smart sensor was unpredictable, i.e. many errors were 
recorded which could not be reproduced with the delay of 2s. We needed an 
additional 4s for simulating the reset button because the relay card we used is slow 
and with shorter delays it would be hard to be sure that the reset operation was 
simulated properly. A timing accuracy of 2s is acceptable for the device we have been 
analysing, but we plan to perform a more accurate response time analysis in 
subsequent research. 
Apart from these two applications, we used another one developed by the 
manufacturer of the smart sensor in order to configure the smart device via a PC and 
read the state of the process variable of the device. 
5.3   Test Analysis 
We implemented an off-line test results checker (an oracle) as an application. The 
result checking process is identical no matter which test data generation procedure is 
used. It takes the test result file comprising a sequence of smart sensor inputs and 
outputs and then checks if they agree with the internal model of the device built into 
the application. The model is a finite state machine defined based on the behaviour 
specified in the user manual. As the documentation is not precise, the model must try 
to take the weakest assumptions possible, i.e. permit all behaviours which do not 
conflict with the manufacturer’s documentation. If the outputs of the oracle and the 
actual result disagree, the checker generates a list of potential errors. 
The result checker is highly configurable. It specifies the configuration of each 
alarm relay (e.g. type, limit, deadband, latch mode, and relay delay). Its interface is 
shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 Fig. 11. Result checker interface 
Given the input data, smart device configuration and delay data, the oracle can 
compute the result and compare it with the actual result. This is not as straightforward 
as it may first appear, as discrepancies can be generated if the expected result is not 
unique. Section 2 discusses the possible sources of non-deterministic results. The 
result checker has to identify all the possible interpretations of the inputs, and based 
on this data calculate all the possible states of the modelled device. If any of the 
threads has output values that match the test result, the result is accepted. If none of 
the states resulting from the inputs corresponds to the test result, a discrepancy is 
identified. 
Our non-deterministic model initially assumed that the test value measured by the 
smart device is unchanged between test input changes. However, by monitoring the 
smart device display, we established that the measured value does in fact differ on 
successive internal measurements made by the device. This inherent variability due to 
periodic internal sampling had to be included in the non-deterministic result checking 
model by computing new threads at each potential sample point (using a configurable 
sample rate). 
6   Testing and Test Results 
We applied three test strategies to derive test cases for the device: 
• Statistical testing. We generated and executed 4600 simulated plant transient test 
sequences. For realistic plant transients, this should give 99% confidence in 10-3 
failures per demand if no discrepancies are detected by the result checker. 
Execution of one set of transients takes 8 days of continuous execution by the 
testing harness. 
• Random testing. We generated and executed 10 000 random tests. Execution of the 
tests took 6 hours. 
• Negative testing. We tested the device with: 
− out of range inputs (20% above and below the accepted range) 
− valid, equivalent inputs and checking for variation in the output 
− testing functional independence (i.e. where changes in the device configuration 
influence unrelated functionality) 
− random testing (this time addressing independence and consistency of the 
behaviour of alarms) 
− testing based on transients (this time addressing independence and consistency 
of the behaviour of alarms) 
Execution of the tests led to identification of a few potential discrepancies. Statistics 
about the detection rates for each of the strategies are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Discrepancy detection rates 
Number of discrepancies for a sampling rate 
Test strategy 
non 1/sec 2/sec 30/sec 
Statistical testing 25 13 10 10 
Random testing 0 0 0 0 
Negative testing 1 1 1 1 
 
The table shows the number of discrepancies detected for each of the strategies in 
the function of the assumed device sampling rate. We can see that the number of 
discrepancies detected falls when we assume that the device may change 
interpretation of a constant input. The number of discrepancies becomes constant 
once the sampling rate is increased to 2/sec, which may correspond to the actual 
sampling rate of the device. 
For each of the discrepancies detected we were able to identify the corresponding 
inputs and outputs and present them in the context of adjacent inputs and outputs 
using our analysis tool. An example is shown in Fig. 12. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Discrepancy analysis 
Analysis of the identified discrepancies revealed that all of the discrepancies occurred 
at values close to the configured alarm limits. These discrepancies can be explained if 
we change some the assumptions made about the behaviour of the device. Some of 
the potential explanations are given below: 
• We had assumed that all alarms use the same interpretation of the process variable. 
The data captured seems to suggest however that each of the alarms may interpret 
the input independently, e.g. an input value close to the limit may be interpreted by 
one of the alarms as being above and by another as being below the limit. 
• Our test automation system assumes 2 seconds is sufficient time to wait for a stable 
response, however, for a small fraction of inputs, it seems this delay is insufficient. 
• We might have assumed too small a range around a decision point where the 
interpretation of inputs is considered to be non-deterministic. 
7   Discussion 
From our case study it is clear that black-box testing is a non-trivial task. The number 
of discrepancies detected is very dependent on the accuracy of the model checker and 
its coverage of all sources of non-determinism in the expected result. We have 
independent evidence for believing that the smart device does in fact implement its 
alarm logic correctly, so the residual discrepancies are likely to be due to other 
sources of non-determinism that have not been included in the model checker. 
Clearly we can continue to refine the model checker of smart device behaviour to 
reduce the discrepancies even further, but we need to consider whether this is a 
realistic approach. Effectively, we are inventing a smart device design that can 
explain the observed discrepancies, but in a black-box context, we can never be sure 
the inferred design is actually valid. 
What we really need is a result checker that does not need to know about internal 
details (such as the sampling rate of the device) but is based solely on the published 
behaviour. One possible avenue that we intend to explore is the idea of defining a set 
of “invariant behaviours” derived from the public documentation, e.g.: 
Test_input >> alarm_lim  Alarm=ON 
Test_input << alarm_lim_deadband  Alarm=OFF 
Note that the >> operator is used to denote “definitely greater given the published 
inaccuracy, and the condition has remained true for the smart device’s published 
maximum response time”.  
If we do this, we have to accept that there are points in the test sequence where 
none of the invariants will apply and the model-checker simply has to ignore the 
results generated—discrepancies can only be checked when the invariant condition is 
active. There could also be difficulties with this approach because it assumes test 
points where the answer is unique, i.e. the possible states of the smart device converge 
to a single state. This may not always be true. For example: 
• An alarm is configured to latch permanently if the limit is exceeded 
• The test sequence rises up to the limit then falls 
In this case there are two possible responses so the smart device states will diverge for 
any subsequent test values that stay below the alarm limit. A more complex 
expression of expected behaviour over time would be needed like invariants 
expressed in some form of timed temporal logic [4]. We hope to investigate the 
feasibility of this approach in further research. 
8   Conclusions 
The paper presents a case study in which a test harness for a smart device was 
developed and used to execute a set of black-box test cases defined using several test 
strategies.  
We showed that non-determinism of the smart device response makes the testing 
significantly more difficult. We have sought to address this problem by designing the 
result checker to explicitly allow for non-determinism. When a potentially 
non-deterministic test condition is detected, the result checker creates different 
“threads” representing alternative potential states of the device. Normally the threads 
recombine at a later point in time, when the input leaves the area “close” to limits 
because the threads will converge to an identical internal state. For example, after a 
certain amount of time above a trip limit, all threads will be in the alarm state. 
This strategy has proved to be quite successful, but there are still some residual 
discrepancies that we suspect are false positives. These could probably be removed by 
increasing the complexity of the non-deterministic model of the device, but it is 
difficult to justify the model given that the device is a black-box.  
In the next stage of research we plan to investigate less strict forms of model 
checking where we ignore all test cases where there is any uncertainty about the 
expected results.  
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